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Abstract 
Many as se rt that con st ituent s know l ittle o f  their elected offic ial's behav io r, e specially 
how their representat ive s have voted on spec ific legislat ive b il ls. When leg islat ion con ­
cern s fo re ign affa ir s, the p rospect s fo r con st ituent knowledge a re u sually as se rted to be 
even bleake r. We challenge the se as se rt ion s. Ou r challenge is based on an inten sive 
analy sis o f  one h ighly sal ient roll call vote: The Hou se and Senate vote s on the January 
14, 1 991 "U se o f  Fo rce Resolut ion ." U sing data from the 1 990- 1 991 Panel Study o f  the 
Pol it ical Con sequences o f  War we exam ine con st ituent percept ion s o f  Hou se and Senate 
member "U se o f  Fo rce Re solut ion" votes. We find that aggregate pe rcept ion s o f  senato r 
votes vary accord ing to the senato r 's party, h is o r  he r tenure and past electo ral compet i­
t iveness. At the ind iv idual level, we find that, wh ile more info rmed con st ituent s had more 
accu rate pe rcept ion s, many less- info rmed c it izen s  we re able to u se read ily-unde r standable 
cues in develop ing the ir pe rcept ion s. 
"I 'm losing a lot o f  sleep over this . . . This is p robably the most important vote I will 
ever ca st as a public o fficial, and I don't want to be wrong." 
Rep resentative Timothy J. Penny, 
(D -MN), CQ WR January 5, 1 991, page 1 1 ,  
discussing the fo rthcoming "Use o f  Force Resolution" vote. 
"I never t hought that the first time I would have an opportunity to speak in  this chamber 
the topic would be such a g rave topic . . .  l i fe and death, whether o r  not to go to war, 
to ask Ame rica's men and women, so many o f  them so young to risk li fe and limb, to 
unleash a t remendous dest ructive power  on a foreign count ry and a far a way people. This 
is the most momentous decision that an y political leade r would ever have to make and 
decide we must." 
Senato r Paul D .  Wellstone, 
(D-MN) ,  January 10, 1 991 , du ring the floo r debate 
ove r the "Authori zation for the Use o f  Force against 
I raq Resolut ion. "  
Perception and Misperception: Constituent 
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1 Introduction 
Like Representative Penny and Senator Well stone, many member o f  Congress publicly 
agoni zed over their "U se of Force Re solution" vote s.1 During the fall o f  1991 ,  public sen­
timent again st Iraq's aggre ssion in Kuwait climbed, and there support grew for President 
Bush 's military buildup in the Persian Gul f. However, there were con si stent call s from 
con stituent s, and from Democratic party leaders, for continued pre ssure on Iraq through 
U.N.- en forced economic sanction s. Thu s the dilemma for many lawmakers, e specially on 
the Demo fratic sides of the Hou se and Senate , was acute. 
After eight day s of debate, carried live on C -Span, excerpted exten sively on the Cable 
Ne ws Net work, National Public Radio, public televi sion, and covered in exhau stive detail 
in both national and local media, both branche s voted on . January 14. In the Senate, the 
vote was close, with 52 voting to authori ze the u se of force and 4 7 voting against. The 
"'R. Michael Alvarez is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Division of Humanities and 
Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena CA 91 125. Paul W. Gronke is an 
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham 
NC 27706. This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the Conference on the Political 
Consequences of War, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., February 28, 1992. We thank 
Thomas Mann for sponsoring that conference; John Aldrich, John Brehm, Charles Franklin, Ole R .  
Holsti, David Leege, Douglas Rivers, and John Zaller for their contributions to our work; and John 
Bainey and Abby Delman for their assistance. Some of the data used in this paper were originally 
collected by the Center for Political Studies and Distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research. 
1The debate over the use of force in the Persian Gulf took place from January 7 - January 14, 1991. 
The conflict devolved into a choice between authorizing the use of force for only enforcing an economic 
embargo ( .. continuing sanctions") versus a more blanket endorsen1ent of the use of force. The resolutions 
that passed were SJRes2 (the Warner bill) and HJRes62 (the Michel bill); the alternative resolutions 
were SJR.esl (Nunn/Mitchell) and IIJRes62 (Solarz). 
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vote in the Hou se was not as clo se, with almo st 58% of the House supporting the u se of 
military force again st I raq.2
At the time of the Per sian Gulf War vote, there wa s widesp read speculation that 
the position s taken by many representative s - e specially those who opposed the "Use 
of Force Resolution" - would haunt them in the 1992 elections. But for that to have 
o ccu r red, th r ee  condition s were nece ssary: the positions of incumbent candidates mu st
be readily known by the ele cto rate ; thi s i ssue mu st be salient among voter s; and the 
voter s  mu st have u sed thi s in formation when evaluating competing candidate s. 
At thi s time, it i s  not clear what role the "U se of For ce Re solution" played in the 
1992 election s. Some have hinted that a hand ful of senator s, most particularly Senator s
Sanford (D-NC) and Fo wle r  (D-GA),  may have been hu rt by st ridently opposing the u se 
of fo r ce again st Iraq. While thi s might be t rue ; it i s  clear that a widesp read repudiation 
of i n cumbent s who voted again st the u se of fo r ce did not occur. The aggregate re sult s 
of the 1 992 election s do not support a claim that thi s parti cular vote i n fluenced many 
ele ction outcome s. Of all tho se who left either legi slative b ranch during the 1992 ele ctions, 
50% of the senato r s  and 48% of the Hou se membe r s  voted again st the " Use of Force 
Resolution." These figu re s change little when we examine reti rement s, p rimary losse s, 
o r  general election losse s: in the Senate, 3 of the 7 reti ring member s voted again st the
resolution, and 3 of 5 lo sing an ele ction voted again st ;  in the Hou se, 4 7% of the reti rees, 
and 49% of the lo se r s, voted agai n st the re solution (of the p rimary lo se r s, 4 7% voted 
again st, and of the general ele ction lose r s, 50% voted again st) .  
Thi s i s  not su rp ri sing, given the conventional wi sdom about public opinion and foreign 
policy. The publi c h as  not been accorded mu ch ability o r  willingness to learn about 
foreign affair s. The t raditional vie w as se rt s  that the public's vie ws of foreign affai r s  
are unstable, unst ru ctu red, and rela tively uninfo rmed. Given that politic s i s  a di stant 
and tangential to mo st Ame ri can s, it i s  easy to con clude that fo reign affai r s  mu st be an 
ob scu re and unimportant element of the politi cal world. Thu s, sin ce public opinion i s  
relatively incon sequential as a guiding facto r fo r elite po licy making, the mass publi c i s
a fo r ce to be led , not follo wed (Hol sti 1992). 
There have been challenge s to the conventional vie w. Kinde r and Sea r s  ( 1985) sug­
ge st that some foreign event s  have domesti c rami fications: the sei zu re of the Ameri can 
Embassy in Tehe ran and the Soviet invasion of Afghani stan might have given Carte r the 
ne cessary support to beat ba ck Kennedy's 1980 primary challenge (Kinder and Sea r s  
1985:680). Pe ffley and Hur witz ( 1 985, 1992) claim that publi c opinion on foreign affai r s  
i s  as stable and stru ctur ed as  opinion s on domesti c affai r s  ( while ackno wledging that the 
survey s have t ypi cally not a sked the appropriate question s sui table fo r rigo rou s analy si s). 
Aldrich , Sullivan and Borgida ( 1989), u sing a model of attitude accessibility, sho w  that 
when for eign poli cy attitude s are both available and acce ssible, foreign affai r s  opinion s 
influence citi zen voting, at least in pr esidential conte st s. In thei r detailed revie w of hi s­
tori cal t rend s in publi c opinion, Page and Shapiro ( 1992) sho w  that publi c opinion-even 
2The House vote was 250 in favor, and 183 against. 
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o n  foreign affai rs-does respond to real wo rld events a nd to i nformation p resented to the
public by political leaders and the mass media. Fi nally, i n  both the domestic a nd foreign 
policy realm, the public acts as an echo chamber. When disti nctive policy positions are 
articulated by political elites o r  whe n  there is elite consensu s o n  policy di rection, public 
igno rance and confusion appears to be dimi nished (Ki nder a nd Sears 1 985: 663 ; Zaller 
1 992: 107 ; Stimso n 1 990). 
These revisions poi nt out that unde r ce rtai n conditions a nd for certai n foreign events, 
public opi nion can be i nformed, di rected, and consequential. This leads us to be opt i ­
mistic that co nstitue nts will both k no w  the positions taken by thei r rep resentatives on  
the "Use o f  Force Resolution," and that this k no wledge wi ll be used i n  th ei r  pe rceptions 
o f  these rep resentative s. We a rgue that the Pe rsian Gul f War meets these conditions.
Fi rst, the con flict wa s mo re than a mere fo reign policy "event." It i nvolved a ma ssive 
commitment o f  Ame rican milita r y  fo rces, an action which histo rically has had impo rtant 
domestic con sequences: "The Ko rean and Vietnam Wars and the I ranian Hostage C risis 
exempli fied 'inte rme stic' i ssues: foreign i ssue s  that had a st ro ng domestic compone nt 
that affected dai l y  l ife." (Hess and Nel son, quoted in Ald rich et al. 1 989: 124). Military 
commitment s can take ove r political l ife in the count r y, pushi ng a side all other issues. 
As has been demon st rated with regard to p re sidential app roval rati ngs, foreign military 
commitments st rongl y influence domestic politics (Mueller 1 973 ; Kernel l 1 97 8; MacKuen 
1 983 ; Hibb s 1 987) .  
Fu rthermo re, cove rage of the "u se of force re solution" wa s inte nse. Zaller ( 1 992: 1 06) 
desc ribe s the debate ove r the wa r re solution as a classic ca se o f  elite and public opi n­
ion polari zation. The Democ rat s in Cong ress suppo rted a policy o f  co nti nui ng economic 
sanction s, while the Republican s joined P resident Bu sh i n  support for a p roactive use of  
milita r y  force. So  we expect the inten se and polari zed debate on  this issue to lead to 
heightened public awareness and parti san pattern s of respo nse, with Democ rats movi ng 
more again st the u se of force and Republican s more in favo r. This implies that i nforma­
tion about the Gulf War re solution wil l  be partl y dete rmi ned by the partisanship o f  the 
individual re spondent and the member of Congress. 
In thi s pape r, we anal yze con stituent knowledge of thei r rep re sentative' s vote on the 
"U se of Fo rce Resolution " in the context of thi s lite ratu re on foreign affai r s  and public 
opinion . The re a re compelling theoretical reason s fo r focu ssing on thi s speci fic vote. 
Fi r st, we a re inte re sted in the pol i t ical ramification s of thi s salient and cont rove r sial floo r  
vote. Most rep re sentatives publicl y di scu ssed thei r position s, and the debate con sumed 
media headlines for week s. Under the se condition s, fo reign policy attitudes should be 
accessible to citi zen s, and influential in thei r political pe rception s (Ald rich et al. 1 989) .  
Second , thi s i s  a ve r y  speci fic attitude - di rect knowledge o f  a si ngle roll call vote. 
Mo st re search on foreign policy attitude s (and on polic y attitude s in gene ral ) ,  focu ses  
on b road i ssue s  like change s in de fen se spending, relation s with other nations, or  the 
th reat of nuclear wa r .  it i s  di ffic ult to asse ss the level of individual knowledge, and 
whethe r an indi vidual hold s actual opinion s, about such i ssue s. There are no available 
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yard stick s which researchers can use to judge citizen k nowledge . In our case, we pos­
sess a preci se yardstick: the represe ntative's roll call vote. Combi ni ng that i nformation 
with constituent perceptions of the roll call gives u s  a u nique chance to understand for ­
eign policy attitudes and political opi nion formation more generally. T hi s  put s u s  i n
an  e xcellent position to u nderstand perceptions, since we have accurate a nd ob jective 
i nformation about the positio ns of the represe ntatives o n  thi s particular i ssue, u nlike the 
research o n  broader i ssue s  which e mploy less accurate , more sub jective m easures of the 
represe ntative's positions (Powell 1 989; Frankli n  1 991 ; Alvarez and Frankli n 1 992). 
Third , almost all work focuses on  the influence of foreign policy attitudes o n  presi ­
dential approval or electio ns, or o n  executive branch deci si on making (e.g. , Mueller 1 973 ; 
Graham 1 989; Aldrich et al. 1 989). Few studies exami ne the effect s of foreign policy 
opinion s on congre ssional elections or deci sionmaking, de spite work by Bartels which 
" suggests that public opinion was a powerful force for polic y change in the realm of 
defen se spending in the fir st year of the Reagan administration" (Bartels 1 991 :467). Un­
derstanding the constituent 's knowledge of their representative's behavior has important 
ramification s for model s of the constituent -representative relation ship. 
The remainder of thi s paper i s  organi zed into three section s. In the ne xt section , we 
discu ss the survey data and anal yze the accurac y of constituent perception s in the aggre­
gate. We propose and test a perceptual model that draw s upon a set of contextual and 
ideological indicators for Senator s. Then we di saggregate the survey data, and present 
models of accurac y for those who claim to know the repre sentatives ' votes and those 
who were willing to guess the representatives vote . We close by di scu ssing the implica­
tion s of our results , particularl y for research on citizen understandings of repre sentative's 
position s and on foreign affair s  opinion s. 
2 The Use of Force Resolution: A First Look 
In thi s paper . we rel y on question s contained in the National Election Studies ' 1 990-1 991 
Panel Stud y of the Political Consequences of War /1 991 Pilot Stud y. A brief di scussion of 
the question s and the respon se s  the y elicited i s  in order , since the y differ in some respects 
from the usual NES que stion s about re spondent knowledge of their representatives. The 
specific question s we examine in the remainder of this paper concern a re spondent 's recall 
of how her House and Senate representatives voted on the "Use of Force Resolution" on 
Januar y 14, 1991. Each respondent in the 1 991 surve y was presented with two que stion s 
for each of her three congressional representative s. The wording of the se questions ap ­
pears in the appendix. 3 Respondent accurac y rates, calculated as the percentage who 
3The questions for the House members were asked first, followed by questions for one senator (denoted 
by the NES as Senator I) and then the other senator (Senator 2). There was no particular pattern 
we could ascertain in the placen1ent of senators into either set. We uncovered an unusual problem 
associated with the two-senator structure: a response-set bias exists in the data since. As we show 
beiow, respondents are more accurate in their perceptions of <!Senator 2,�' even after controiiing ior 
a number of independent variables. Another problem in the survey data centered around a summary 
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"recalled" or "gue ssed "  the rep re se ntative's v ote on the U se of Force Resoluti on c or ­
rectly, are given i n  Table 1 .  I n  thi s table, the c olumns give the percentages of resp onse s, 
c orrect re sp onses, fal se p ositives, and fal se negatives, for four set s of rep re se ntatives: 
H ou se member s, all senat ors ( " stacked dataset"), and the tw o senat ors from each state 
as categorized by the NES.4 
The first row of Table 1 acc ords with the c onve nti onal view of foreign a ffai rs opi ni ons 
and k nowledge of repre se ntatives ' roll call v otes. O nly 24% of the 1 991 panel resp onde nt s  
claimed t o  b e  able t o  recall their H ouse member's v ote while 27% claime d recall of thei r 
senat or 's v ote. Thi s  h ol ds an  imp ortant implicati on: less than si x m onth s  after thi s 
p olitically c onte nti ous a nd well -c overed floor v ote, r oughly thr�uarters of resp onde nt s  
could not recall the vote of their representatives. 5 
I s  it reas onable t o  st op with these figures , and c onclu de that c on stitue nts a re p oorly 
i nformed ab out foreign affairs? In tw o recent nati onal p ost-electi on surveys ( 1 988 and 
1 990) ,  the NES has asked each resp ondent whether they recalled her H ouse membe r's 
v ote on any bill i n  the past few years. 6  In 1 988, onl y 10. 7 %  of resp ondents, and i n  1 990 
1 1 . 1  % of resp ondents, said they c ould recall any roll call vote. The fact that over twice 
as many resp on de nts state d they could recall the "Use of Force Res oluti on" v ote strikes 
us as an imp ortant differe nce. 
Als o, the resp onse marginals for the next two que sti ons ( data n ot sh ow n i n  Table 1 ), 
aski ng for the resp on dent 's recall or guess of the represe ntative's v ote, in dicate a high level 
of public awareness and kn owledge of the "Use of Force Res oluti on" , eve n am ong those 
wh o state d n o  recall of their representative's v ote. Of those wh o state d they k new their 
represe ntative's v ote, over 99% were willing t o  state that the represe ntative had v oted 
for or against the res oluti on. Am ong th ose wh o di d not recall, 84.6% of the resp ondents 
were willing t o  guess their H ous e member 's p ositi on, and 85.4 % and 86.3% were willi ng 
t o  guess their senat ors ' p ositi ons. B oth of these p oints caught our attenti on si nce we 
were surprised by what appears t o  be an extremely high level of public awareness and 
k nowledge of the "Use of Force Res oluti on" v ote, even am ong th ose wh o state d that they 
variable the NES prepared that aggregates "recall" and "guessing." We show shortly that it is misleading 
to lump two very different respondent groups into a single variable1 given the great heterogeneity across 
"recall" and "guessing" rates. In data not shown here, it is also apparent that the rates of "recall" and 
"guessing" vary dramatically across individual senators. 
4In the remainder of this paper we report results based on analyses of the stacked senator dataset. 
Stacking the senator dataset creates two observations for each respondent, one for the first senator, 
another for the second. This doubles the sample size of our dataset, thereby increasing the efficiency 
of our estimates. This procedure also risks introducing heteroskedasticity into our analyses, since it is 
likely that error. terms .for .a particular respondent are correlated across the.two observations. The same 
phenomenon is likely to arise in our aggregate models. Accordingly, we use heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors in models involving stacked senator data. 
'Note that the first row of each panel in Table I includes 25% of the California sample who claimed 
to know how Alan Cranston voted, and 97 who were willing to guess, even though Cranston did not 
vote on the war resolution! 
6ln both the 1988 and 1 990 post-election surveys, the NES posed an identical question to respondents: 
"Was there any bill in particular that you remember how (he/she) voted on in the past few years?" 
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could not recall their represe ntative's vote . Perhap s public awarene ss of thi s vote w as  
consi derable. 
To get a better u nder standi ng of the pattern of k nowi ng a nd guessi ng, we compared 
the respo nde nt 's recall or guess of the represe ntative's vote with the actual roll call votes 
of each member. The percentage s of correct recall s and guesse s  are i n  the second a nd si xth 
row s of Table 1 .  The first poi nt to notice i s  that accuracy rates are approximately 1 7 %  
higher for those respondent s who recalle d the war vote relative to those who guessed. 
But how accurate shoul d  respo ndent s be? The relevant sta ndar d  for t he se figures i s
not com plete i naccuracy, si nce i ndepende nt random gue sse s  woul d have resulted i n  50% 
accuracy rates. By thi s standar d, guessers do not do much better than simp le random 
guessi ng ( 10.5 % i n  the Hou se an d 8.8 % in the Senate), while tho se -who recal led  the 
represe ntative's vote performed much better (27.5 %  i n  the Hou se, 25.5% i n  the Senate). 
C learly, k no v;ing ver su s  gue ssing i s  a meaningfu l di stinction. 
The secon d  ob servation to take from Tab le 1 i s  the clear differences betwee n Hou se 
and Senate members. In the Hou se ,  the fal se positive s and fal se negatives are evenly 
balance d, imp lyi ng that respon de nt s  were just as  likely to mi stake nly say that their 
Hou se repre sentative voted agai nst the resolution as to say their Hou se member vote d 
for it .  Senators were perceived different ly: fal se po sitives are a lmo st three times as likely 
amo ng tho se who recalled  the Se nator's  vote and two times as likely amo ng those who 
gue sse d. Senator s were perce ive d as sub stant ia lly more support ive of the u se of m il itary 
force in the Per sian Gu lf than Hou se members, even though the vote i n  the Hou se was 
more supportive of the "U se of Force Reso lution" (64 %  support) than the Senate (53 % 
support) .  The combination of parti san an d i n stitutional cues le d to an i nteresting patter n. 
There i s  substantial parti san tilt among gue ssi ng across both i n stitutions - accuracy 
rates were 21  % higher among responde nt s who guessed at Repub lican versu s  Democratic 
Senator s' po sitions (71% versu s  50 %). The Hou se compari son i s  a lmo st i de ntical (a 14% 
parti san tilt ; 703 versu s  56 % ). Among tho se who recalled, by contrast, parti san  ti lt i s  
o nly apparent in the perception s of Senator s. Whi le 22% more recalle d their Repulican
Senator 's po sition accurate ly (88 %  versu s  66 %) ,  the gap· in the Hou se was mi nimal (only 
8 %; 83% versu s  75 % ) .  The se are noteworthy institutional differe nce s. 
Fi nal ly, notice that accuracy rates are higher for Senator Two than for Senator O ne .  
Thi s i s  particu lar ly obviou s among those who recalled the Senator 's vote ( 1 4% greater) . 
Thi s i s  true de spite virtually i dentical rates of fal se po sitive s and negatives. These differ­
e ntial accuracy rates might have two sources. First ,  they might be cau se d  by sy stematic 
di fference s in the Senator s who were in the fir st or secon d category: that i s, there might 
be something which sy stematic ally made it easier for re spon dent s  to accu rately recally 
or guess the position s of the second Senator relative to the fir st . 7 Secondly, these dif­
fere nces might be a simple re spon se -set prob lem. Here, the simp le stimu lu s  of recalli ng 
or guessing the po sition of the fir st Senator might have led to more accurate recalli ng 
or guessing of the secon d Senator. It i s  to thi s que stio n, accou nti ng for the variance in 
7However, as mentioned above, we couid not discern any reason for the piacement into '!Senator One" 
or �senator Two". (It is not a function of year of election, tenure, or party) . 
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accuracy rates across the Senators in this sample, that we now consider. 
3 An Aggregate Model of Perceptual Accuracy 
A skeptical reader of Table 1 might conclude that constituents are poorly-informed about 
both foreign affairs and the positions of their representatives on such policy matters. Ad ­
ditionally, another reading might be that irregardless of the percentages we just reported, 
these survey questions are eliciting "non-opinions" rather than actual perceptions (e.g. 
Converse 1 964 ; Achen 1 975). 
How can we discount these clai ms ?  Others have dealt with similar critiques in p ast 
research. Conover and Fe ld man (1 98 9) attempted to reconcile the wi llingness of respon ­
dents to p lace candidates on a variet y of issues and the seeming lack of information 
pertinent to make such placements. The y approached the problem b y  examining the 
information and the cognitive processes that respondents e mployed in order to place the 
candidates. A respondent 's p lacement of a candidate on an issue turned out to be a 
function of individual (the respondent 's own position on the issue and their evaluation of 
the candidate) and contextual (candidate positions, part y positions, and media coverage) 
elements. 
Powel l (1 989) took a si mi lar approach in trying to understand the cognitive process 
respondents used when the y placed members of Congress on the liberal /conservative 
scale. Powell went one step further, however , considering the accuracy of the p lacements 
as we ll as the process that generated the placements .  Powell found that those who 
inferred o t  "guessed " the representative 's position differed from those who were more 
informed on various individual- leve l di mensions (education , age, gender , and length of 
residence).8 While contextual information (incumbent seniorit y) did not influence the
probabil ity of guessing the incu mbent candidate 's position, e lectoral competitiveness did 
influence guessing the challenger 's ideo logical positions ... 
A slight ly different approach was developed by  Franklin ( 1 991 ) .  He argued that the 
process of candidate ideological perception h as  three components: information about 
the candidate , information used to i nfer characteristics of the candidate, and the voter 's 
own preferences. Respondents uti lize contextual, inferential , and personal preference 
information when stating their representative 's ideological position. The accurac y of their 
perception is contingent on the respondent 's sophistication, electoral competitiven ess ,  
and issue-infor mation derived from the campaign. 
We draw upon this lit erature to examine the accurac y of citi zen perceptions of the 
"Use of Force Reso lution " votes of the incu mbent Senators in our sample.9 Our model
151n Powell's definition, "guesses" are "estimates unrelated to the candidate's true position on the 
scales, which have now been established by the relationship between the ACA score and the knowledge­
abie contri butor's piacement ... (Poweii i989: 279). 
9lt is not possible to replicate this analysis for the House. Unfortunately, there are too few respondents 
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of perceptual accuracy is  different from those just discussed, particularl y since we are 
studying accuracy rates for Senate incumbents on one roll call vote, not on a more 
general liberal / conservative dimension. This is useful since we have a p recise measure 
of accuracy - whether the respondent recalled or guessed the vote correctly.10 Our
model is similar in that we assume perceptual accuracy is driven by both contextual 
and individual i nformation. In this section we discuss the contextual determinants of 
perceptual accuracy across Senators, and in  the next section we generalize our approach 
to an individual-level model of perceptual ac curacy . 
There are four dependent variables in this analysis: the percent of respondents who 
stated they recalled the Senator 's war resolution vote, who correctly recalled the vote , 
who co rrectly gue ssed the Senator's vote , and who correctly recalled or gue ssed the 
vote. The independent variables were culled from the p ast works we just discussed, and 
measure the senator 's ideological extremity , party affiliation, length of tenure, years since 
last elected, and previou s electoral competitiveness. Operati onali zati ons of each variable 
appear in the appendix. 11 
Con sider the m odel for the percent who recalled the war vote of each Senator (column 
one o f  Table 2) .  The reported R2 for this model is quite lo w (0.14), showing that thi s 
model d oe s  not account for much of  the variation in rates of recall across Senators. O f
the substantively important independent variable s, only two reach reasonable levels o f  
statistical significance : the Senator's tenure (signi ficant at the p = 0.05 level) and the 
Senator 's party (signi ficant at p = 0 . 10, both one-tailed tests) .  The estimated coeffi­
cients are al so correctly signed. The tenure coefficient is positive , meaning that greater 
percentages o f  re spondents c ould recall their Senator 's vote the longer Senator had been 
in o ffice. The impact o f  thi s variable is si zeable: 10 m ore years o f  tenure i s  associated 
with a 4.43 increase in the percentage of respondent s who stated they could recall the 
vote, ceteris paribus. The e stimated coefficient on party affiliati on i s  negative, imply­
ing that fewer re spondents recalled the war resolution vote when their Senator was a 
Democrat than when the Senat or was a Republican; in fact , a Democratic Senator has 
an estimated 4 . 13 fewer respondents recalling their v ofe than a Republican Senators, 
ceteris paribus. Respondent s have more difficulty recalling the votes o f  less-tenured and 
Democratic Senators , the fir st since they have less in formation ab out junior Senator s, 
and the second since the vote split the Democratic party in the Senate - with some 
voting for the resolution and some against. 
in each congressional district to compute reliable percentages. The working sample size within each of 
the 122 congressional districts in the 1990-1991 Panel Study averages 22.78, with standard deviation of 
22.6. The largest sample is 90; the smallest sample is I.  41 of the district samples are smaller than 10. 
Over one-third of congressional district samples- are clearly .too smalLto produce reliable percentages. 
By contrast, the state samples average 91.3 cases; the three smallest state samples are 34, 40, and 56.
10The other models relied upon interest group ideological ratings as baselines to measure perceptual 
accuracy, which are not as precise a procedure. 
11 AH variables are from Politics in An1erica, 1992. Vv'e added a dummy variable in these models to
account for heterogeneity in responses to these questions across the two Senators for each state1 coded 1 
for the first senator and 2 for the second. Last, we estimate heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors 
{White 1980) which alleviate the problems of heteroskedasticity in our data. All of the multivariate 
models reported in this paper were estimated using SST, Version 2.0 (Dubin and Rivers 1992). 
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Next, consider the results for recall and guessi ng, reported i n  the sec ond a nd thi rd 
columns of Table 2. Both these models fit the data much better, with  R2 values of 0.44 
(correct recall) and 0.31 (correct guessi ng). These models account re asonably well for 
the variation i n  percentages of those who recalled and guessed the votes of Senators. 
More importantly, the re are e xplicable patte rns of perceptual accu racy among those who 
recalled and those who guessed. However, only one variable i n  the recall e quation reaches 
statistical significance: party affiliation of the Se nato r. The negative sig n of the estimated 
coefficient i ndicates that the perce ntages of correct recalls were lower for Democrats 
than for Republicans, similar to the e ffect of party on  the ability to recall . I n  cont ra.st, 
though, notice the mag nitude of thi s e ffect: after cont rolli ng for the e ffects of electoral 
competitive ness, tenu re, and ideological ext remity, the percentage of respondents who 
correctly recalled the vote of a Democratic Senator was 24 % lo wer  than for a Republican 
Se nators. 
I n  the m odel predi cting correct guessing (third column of Table 2) ,  the t wo electo ral 
variable s meet con venti onal stati sti cal signi fican ce levels, alo ng with partisanship. The 
effe ct of party affiliati on i s  still negati ve ,  but i s  n ot as substantial as in the correct recall 
m odel: the per centages of re sp ondent s  wh o correctly guessed the Senato r's vote were 
1 7 .8 %  lo wer  for Dem ocrat s than Republi can s, a d iffe re nce of 6 .2 %, ceteris paribus. The 
e stimated effe ct s of the time sin ce the Senat or l a.st st ood for election a nd the Senator's 
margin of vi ct ory in the previ ou s  electi on are b oth negati ve .  Thi s mean s that, co nt rolli ng 
for the other var iables i n  the m odel, re sp ondent s  could mo re accu rately guess the roll 
call p ositi on of Senat or s wh o had m ore re cently st ood for elect ion  and who had ran i n  a 
m ore competiti ve race .  A one-unit change in the estimated effe ct of the time sin ce the 
Senat or l a.st st ood for elect ion i s  associated with a 2.6 % fall in the per centage of correct 
guessing. A Senat or wh o st ood for electi on in 1 988 w ould have 5 .2 %  fewer constitutents 
wh o correctly gue ssed their vote relati ve t o  a Senat or wh o st ood for electi on in 1 990 and 
a Senat or who st ood for electi on in 1986 w ould have 10.7% fewer con stitue nts correctly 
guessing their vote relati ve t o  a Senat or wh o st ood in  the 1 990 electi on .  A one-u nit change 
i n  the Senat or 's l a.st elect oral per centage yield s an estimated drop i n  the perce ntages of 
corre ct guessing of 0 .34 %. Prima facie , that seem s like a small e ffect. Howeve r, compare 
a Senat or who won in  the last elect ion with 51 % of the vote and one wh o w on with 61 % 
of the vote. The latter Senat or - w ho was clearly in a less competiti ve electi on - w ould 
have 3.4 % fewer re sp ondent s who correctly gue ssed their " Use of For ce Resoluti on" vote . 
Clearly the e ffe ct of ele ctoral competiti veness i s  n ot as strong as either party affiliati on 
n or the length of time si n ce their l ast elect ion. 
These regressi on re sult s  lead to a number of imp ortant con clu si on s. Fir st, and m ost 
importantly, we find syste mati c  patte rn s. acr oss Senatocs in the ·aggr egate per centages 
of re call ,  corre ct recall, and corre ct guessing, thereby providing str ong eviden ce that 
resp ondent s are n ot an swering these questi on s  rand omly. Ou r models suggest, i n  fact, 
that conte xtual i nformati on ab out the se Senat or s u ndergird s the re sp on se pattern s t o  
the que sti on s  con cerning the " Use of For ce Resoluti on ." Se cond, we have fou nd that 
it i s  part£san and not ideological informati on whi ch account s for variati on s  in accuracy 
rates. Our re sult s stand in contr ast t o  the w ork of C on over and Feldman ( 1989) and 
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Frankl in (1991), who both argued that ideological cues figured promine ntl y in voter 
inferences about the ir representat ives. O f  course the work o f  Conover and Fe ldman and 
Frankl in does concern ideological placements, wh ile ours is concer ned w ith  a ctual roll 
call votes. Third, our results support Powell 's find ings regarding guess ing. I n  our model 
o f  the perce ntages o f  correct guessing, we fou nd, l ike Powell ,  that perceptual a ccuracy is 
dependent upo n electoral compet it ion  and not necessaril y o n  length o f  tenure. 
Our results d iffer from Powell's in an important respe ct. In our re call model, we find 
that that ele ctoral compet it ion  did not matter ; onl y  part isan informat ion a ccou nted for 
var iat ion across Senators in the rates o f  correct recall. Our inferen ce regard ing the d iffer ­
e nces in the effe cts o f  electoral compet it ion across our two models is that the pro cesses 
o f  accurate re call and a ccurate guessing are distin ct. Respondents who are guess ing are
relying upon information obtained during recent ele ctoral campaig ns, whereas those who 
·re call draw upon more longstanding bases of in format ion about the candidates and the 
mean ing o f  the two parties. At the very least, party d ifferen ces on the " Use o f  Force 
Resolution " served as a per cep tual aid to those who claimed to recall the vote. S in ce we 
are ul timately con cerned with per cep tion and misper cept ion at the individual level, we 
now turn to individual-level models o f  re call and guessing. 
4 Individual-Level Perceptions of The Use of Force 
Resolution 
Models of  poli ti cal per cep tions fo cus on the interaction between ind iv idual ab il it y  and 
desire to learn about politi cs ,  and the way the pol iti cal environment supplies in forma­
tion. Poli ti cal sophis ti cation plays a central role in individuals evaluation o f  pol it ical 
candidates ( Rahn 1990 ; Rahn ,  Aldri ch ,  Borgida and Sullivan 1992 ; Lodge , M cGraw and 
Stroh 1989) ,  the sus cep tibili ty of  individuals to "p riming" ( Iyengar and K inder 1987; 
Krosni ck and Kinder 1 990), and more broadly the way that i ndividuals respond to pol iti ­
cal s timuli (Zaller 1992) .  Politi cally sophis ti cated ind ivi duals have s chemas or knowledge 
structures that allow them to more qui ckly understand and in corporate new information 
into pree xisting belie f sys tems. Frequen cy o f  e xposure also affe cts the likelihood that a 
message will be incorporated. Mass media usage , for e xample, in creases the likelihood 
that indi Yiduals learn about poli ti cal events (Zaller 1 992 ; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Fi­
nally, p ercep tion depends on the i n teraction between the credibility o f  the source, the 
dire ction o f  the mess age , and the individual 's prior held belie fs (Franklin 1993 ; Zaller 
1992 ; M cGuire 1969 ; Sheri f and Sheri f 19 67). 
A ccordingly, we hypothesi ze th at politi cal learning and in formation abou t the Gul f 
War Resolu tion is a produ ct o f  two se ts o f  variables. The first re fle ct individual charac­
teris ti cs: the individual 's level of  poli ti cal in formation , media e xposure, and in terest in 
the Gulf \\'ar con fli ct .  The se cond re fle ct a combination of individual characteristi cs and 
cue s fro n1 the politi cal environment � The se include agreement or d isagreement between 
the individual and the House member or Sen ator , evaluations o f  the representative, and a 
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set o f  i nteractions between i ndividual attitudes and characteristics o f  the representative 
or Se nator , such as partisan or ideological agreement. We also i nc lude i n  this third set 
o f  variables, a set o f  conte xtual measures that fu nction as i nferential  cues for respon­
dents. I n  the context o f  the war resolution vote, we suppose that respo nde nts might rely 
o n  broad characteristics o f  the Senator or House member that i ndicate how they voted ,
rather than learni ng al l the specifics o f  this issue. The ki nds o f  cues that respondents 
might use correspo nd nicel y to the predictors used i n  our aggregate model. 
The likelihood and accuracy o f  recall depends first on  the respondent 's po litical sophis­
tication. Fo llowi ng recent research on  what voters k now o f  the positions o f  candidates 
o n  political issues (Alvarez 1992 ; Alvarez and Frankli n !992 ; Frank li n 1992 ; Powe ll 1990;
Bartels 1986),  we argue that individuals who score high l y  o n  i ndices o f  education, politi­
cal i nformatio n, media a tten ti veness, and political efficac y, should be substantiall y more 
likely to recall their represe ntati ve 's vote and to re call or guess that vote correctl y. V/e 
add a measure of  salien ce.  As implied by RePass ( 1 97 1 )  and Aldrich et al. ( 1989), and 
by the cog nitive models ou tlined ab ove, the salien ce o f  the issue should i n flue nce the 
am ount of informati on the resp onden t p ossesses about this issue.12 
We als o need a measure of message discrepan cy and source credibility (Frankli n  1993). 
Ideally, we would have a measure of media coverage during the war resolution debates, 
and could interact this measure wi th the resp onden t's reported opi nion about i nvolve ­
men t i n  the Gulf (mea sured in early 1990, before the U.S. had sent troops). S ince we do 
not have media con ten t measures, we rely on a set o f  surrogates. A measure o f  source 
credibility is available from the NES s tudy: the indi vidual's e valuati on of the represe n­
tative. We hyp othesi ze tha t  voters will recall more accuratel y the positio ns o f  members 
who they evaluate more highly. For measures of message discrepancy, we i nteract the 
indi vidual 's par tisanship wi th the member's par tisanship, and the individual's attitude 
toward the Gulf con fli ct wi th the indi vidual 's perception of  the position taken by the 
member. Therefore, we add to these m odels the resp onden t's ow n evaluatio n o f  the im ­
p or tan ce of the Gulf War, the resp onden t's evaluati on o f  the per formance o f  the House 
member or Senator, and an in teracti on variable , coded l· if the resp onden t's p osi ti on and 
the per cei ved p osi ti on of the represen tati ve were in agreemen t, 0 i f  they were in disagree­
men t.13 We predi ct tha t  indi viduals who were parti cularly approv ing o f  the performance 
o f  their represen ta ti ve, and wh o agreed wi th their ele cted represen ta ti ves w ould be more
likely to re call, and to re call or guess corre ctly, the war resolu ti on vote . 
The predi cti on in b oth ca ses is the same: resp onden ts who are o f  the same par tisan 
lean ings and wh o per cei ve agreement between themsel ves and the member on the Gul f 
12There is a second dimension of salience, specific to the importance of foreign military interventions 
to individual respondents. Like models of economic evaluations and voting, it is possible that those who 
were personally affected by the war - those with relatives or friends who served in the conflict - might 
follow the v.·ar vote more closely than those without this personal connection to the war. However, there 
was no evidence of such an effect in our initial models, and accordingly, the data do not support such a 
"personal" effect upon respondent knowledge of representative voting. 
13\Ve do not have a measure of the partisan and ideoiogicai bias in the messages that respondents 
received (Zaller, 1992). Evaluation and agreement are intended to be surrogates. 
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issue w ill be more l ikel y to recall , and re call and guess accurately. 
Finall y, we allow for the poss ib il ity .that respondents m ight use s impl ifying cues when 
a nswering these ques tions. We include the aggregate measures from the previous sec­
tio n, u nder the assump tion tha t  recall rates also depend o n  how mu ch p ast e xper ie nce 
the ind ividual has w ith the member ( te nure) , how rece ntl y  the cand idate had to s tand 
for reelectio n  (las t electio n, o nl y  appl icable to the Senate) , the inte ns ity of re ce nt cam­
paig n  e xposure (electoral marg in) , and whe ther a member is ideolog icall y e xtreme , and 
therefore eas y to pred ict, or falls i nto the m idrange of ideology. 
Thes e models were es timated via maximu m l ikel ihood prob it. The dependent var i­
ables were (1 ) whe ther the respo ndent s ta ted recall ing the represe ntative 's war vote (all 
respondents) ; (2) whether the respondent recall o f  the represe ntative's war vo te was cor­
rect (only for those who claimed to re call) ;  and (3) whether the respondent's guess was 
corre ct (only those who guessed).14 We refer to these models as "Ab il ity to Re call ", 
"A ccuracy o f  Re call" , and "A ccuracy of  Guess " .  
5 Information, Interest, and Individual Perceptions 
of the Gulf War Vote 
Probit es tima tes are repor ted i n  Table 3 (ab il ity to re call) , Table 4 (accuracy o f  re call) , 
and Table 5 (accuracy o f  guess) .  We repor t the models for the House and the pooled 
Senate data.15 Due to the no n-li near nature o f  the prob it model, it is diffi cul t to inter­
pre te the maximum -likelihood es tima tes dire ctly (Aldri ch and Nelson 1984 ; K ing 1989 ; 
M cCullagh and Nelder 199 1 ) .  To aid the i nterpre tation o f  the magnitude o f  the es ti­
mated effe cts of  each i ndepe nde nt variable we prese nt i n  each table the "firs t di fferences" 
for each probi t model in the colum ns headed by TJ. These " firs t d ifferences" gi ve the 
mag ni tude o f  the es timated effect of  the par ti cular variable, holdi ng the o ther var iables 
co ns ta nt a t  some value.16
We predi cted that poli ti cal sophis ticated respo nde nts should be more l ikely to recall , 
14See the Appendix for NES variable numbers and recodes. As discussed in the previous section1 a 
dummy variable for the positioning of each Senator from each state (either I or 2) is included to eliminate 
the heterogeneity v.1hich is apparent in the response patterns for these survey questions between the two 
Senators. 
15The disaggregated Senate data does not produce results 1nuch different than those presented here, 
except for a decrease in the efficiency of the estimated standard errors. 
16The "'first differences" were obtained by holding the individual-level voter variables constant at their 
mean values (these variables are media attention, political information, efficacy, and education), all of 
the dummy variable were set to one (representative evaluation, agreement with position, salience of issue, 
partisan agreement, and ideological extremityL tenure \\'as set to two, electoral margin to 51 (and for 
senators, last election to 90 and senator number to one). Then the effects of each variable were determined 
by calculating the probability that such an individual would have stated the particular response (recalled, 
recaiied accurateiy, and so on) at the minirnun1 vaiue of the indicator and at the maximum vaiue of the 
indicator. The difference bety,·een these t\\·o values constitutes the "first difference" . 
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a nd more accuratel y recall (or guess), the representat i ve 's vote. These e xpectations 
are generall y  met i n  the three models. O f  the eighteen coe fficients (media attention, 
political i nformation, and education, House a nd Senate, across three models) ,  eleve n  are 
correctl y signed, a nd ni ne are both corr ectl y signed a nd statistical l y significant .  O nl y  
three coefficients are both i ncorrectl y signed and discernabl y di fferent from zero. But 
note the consistentl y strong effect o f  political in formation o n  abilit y a nd accuracy. The 
coefficients o n  the political i nformation variable are always correctl y  signed, and five o f  
si x estimates are discernabl y differe nt from zero. As gi ve n  b y  the "first differe nces," 
moreover, the effects o f  political information are quite sizeable for both the abilit y to 
recall ,  a nd the accurac y o f  recall. These results i ndicate that political i nformation does 
function as predicted b y  the political cognition model, e ve n  i n  the case o f  a relati vel y 
difficult test like recall of a speci fic roll call vote. A more i nformed i ndi vidual is  more 
able to recall the representati ve's war resolution vote, and is more accurate whe n  either 
recalling o r  guessing. 
The cog niti ve model also predicts that the i ndi vidual 's attitude toward politics gener­
all y, a nd their interest in the war vote in particular, will increase the likelihood that the 
respondent would attend to political information. The results here lend weak support 
to our h ypothesis. Salience has a strong impact on the probabili t y  that a respondent 
would recall the gul f vote (see Table 3 ) ; however, salience has a statisticall y i nsigni ficant 
effect on  the probabilit y of correct recall or guess. I ndi viduals who ide ntified the war as 
a particularl y salient event were more con fident in their abilit y to recall the position o f  
their representati ve on the war vote. This con fidence may have been misplaced, however ; 
these same respondents were no more likel y to recall or guess correctly. The estimated 
coefficients on  political efficac y follow a similar pattern; the coefficie nts are statisticall y 
significant .in the ability to recall model, but not in the correct recall or correct guess 
models. These results indicate that political efficac y has little impact on the l ikelihood 
that a respondent attended to information about the Gulf War . Public i nterest i n  this 
e vent was generall y high, independent of an indi vidual 's level o f  political efficacy. 
Our i ndi vidual level variables operated much as we ·expected. Political i nformation 
is the best predictor of the probabilit y that a respondent would be able to recall, and 
whether the recall or guess was accurate. Media attention also appeared to increase the 
respondent 's likelihood of recalling, but did not affect the accurac y o f  recalls or guesses. 
Education also had a mixed effect, in fluenc ing mainl y the accurac y of recall and guessing, 
and not the abili ty  to recall . 
6 The Political Environment and Individual Per­
ceptions of the Gulf War Vote 
The r espondent 's abilit y to recall the Gulf \Var vote also depends on the conte nt of po­
litic�l messages and the exis tence of inferential cues. We tested the impact of t v10 set s  of 
variables. The first set represent source credibilit y, under the assumption that indi viduals 
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lear n  more when they l ike, trust, and agree w ith the sour ce of the message. C it ize ns who 
were self-ident ified Demo crats ought to re call the Gulf War vote of Democrat ic mem­
bers of Congress more frequently and more accurately, a nd v ice versa for Republ icans. 
S im ilarly, respondents w il l  be more l ikel y to re call, a nd w il l  recall more a ccurately, when 
their own pos it io n  o n  the use of force m at ched the ir represent at ive 's pos it io n  a nd or when 
they evalu ated the ir member pos it ively. The seco nd set of var iables refle ct the poss ib il ity 
that there are infere nt ial cues wh ich ind iv idu als m ight use to infer the represe ntat ive 's 
pos it io n: the member's tenure and ideolog ical extremity, the t ime s ince the last elect ion, 
a nd the closeness of the last elect ion. We pred ict that respondents w ill have more accu­
r ate recall when the ir represent at ives h ave a long h istory in the d istr ict ;  s im il arly, re cent 
and inte nse elect ions in crease the l ikel ihood th at the responde nt w as e xposed, and w ill 
be able to draw upon, pol it ical inform at ion about the member. F in ally l ack ing other 
inform at io n, respondents w ill be more able to re call or guess at the pos it io ns of members 
who st and at ideolog ical extremes. 
The results support our hypothes is reg ard ing the imp act of recent elect ions. Respon­
dents from st ates w ith a more re cent Senate elect ion are more l ikely to recall, and m ake 
more accurate re calls and guesses. Co ntr ary to our expe ct at ions, however, electoral m ar­
g in has an in cons iste nt imp act on per cept ions of the war vote. Wh ile in creased vote tot als 
were neg at ively asso ciated w ith the accur acy of guess ing the Sen ators ' and House mem­
ber's pos it ions, as pred icted, m argins are pos it ively asso ciated w ith accur acy of recall 
and ab il ity to re call ( comp are Table 5 to Tables 3 and 4). 
Our hypotheses reg ard ing t enure and ideological e xtrem ity also re ce ive l ittle support. 
I n  only one of s ix cases is the ideolog ical e xtrem ity est im ate st at ist ically s ign ificant and 
posit ive, the House model for accur acy o f  guessing. The tenure coeffi cients, on the other 
h and, re a�h reason able levels of  st at ist ical s ig nifican ce in five of s ix models ( all but the 
accur acy of  guess ing the Se nator 's vote). However, the s ig ns o f  the coeffi cients show 
d ifferent e ffe cts in the ab il ity to re call model, where the more tenure a House member 
has, the less l ikely the respondent is to re call the vote (3 % less l ikely on aver age) ; but 
the more tenure a Sen ator ha s, the more l ikely a resp on t!ent is to re call the vote ( also 
3 %  more l ikely). Yet in both accur acy models the tenure coeffi cie nt has a negat ive s ign, 
show ing th at incumbents w ith shorter Wa sh ingto n e xperien ce are more l ikely to h ave 
respondents who accurately per ce ive their roll call votes. 
The only other var iable th at has a s ignificant effect on  the prob ab il ity o f  correct recall 
is p art is an agreement. I n  the ab il ity to re call model, the results for the House are the 
oppos ite o f  wh at we e xpe cted: ceteris paribus, respondents are 6 %  less l ikely to re call 
the pos it ion of the ir represe nt at ive when they are members of the same pol it ical p arty. 
O n  the other h and , accuracy of  re calls and guesses is posit ively asso ciated w ith p art is an 
agreement , as pred icted (e xcept for the sm all and st at ist ically ins ign ificant coeffi cient in 
the accur acy o f  re call model for the Senate). 
Wh at do these results ind icate? We ident ified a ser ies o f  aggreg ate measures that 
he iped us expl ain var iat ions in re cail at the st ate and congress ion al d istr ict level, yet the 
s ame ind icators give m ixed s ignals at the ind iv idu al level. These results imply th at the 
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relat ionsh ip between the pol it ical environment and ind ividual cognit ion is more complex 
that we have modelled here. In part icular, the process of claim ing to recall (Table 3 )  and 
the processes o f  stat ing the representat ive's pos it ion (either as recall or guess ) , are clearl y 
d ist inct. Contextual cues appear to be more important in the latter process. For e xample , 
cons ider the relat ionsh ip between tenure, electoral margins , and recall. Respondents 
may know more about jun ior members because the y, on a verage, are more act ive in 
the const ituenc y and e xper ience more compet it ive elect ions. S im ilarl y, respondents may 
th ink they recall the pos it ions of Senators who faced close elect ions s impl y because those 
elect ions were more intensel y  fought (lead ing to a negat ive relat ionsh ip between margin 
and recall in Table 3) .  Accurac y o f  recall and guess ing ,  on the other hand , may depend 
more on longstand ing t ies that the members have w ith the const ituency - e xact l y  the 
k inds o f  t ies that are associated w ith large w inning marg ins (thus e xplain ing the pos it ive 
relat ionsh ip in Tables 4 and 5).  Part isan agreement helps a respondent infer the pos it ion 
o f  a member, both as a recall and a guess, but works against the probab il it y  the y w ill
claim to recall the pos it ion in the first place. 
These ind ividual-le vel models lead to a number o f  conclus ions . The first is that the 
amount o f  informat ion a respondent possesses , or more general l y  the ir pol it ical soph ist i­
cat ion, in fluences· the ir percept ions of  th is roll call vote. Secondl y, in none o f  these models 
d id ideolog ical in format ion have a s ign ificant in fluence; instead , part isan cues were g iven 
more we ight. Th ird, t yp icall y the greater the representative's tenure, the less l ikel y it 
was that a respondent recalled , and recalled or guessed accuratel y, the representative's 
vote . Th is impl ies that as representat ives estab l ish Wash ington careers, respondents are 
less able to recount the ir behaviors. Th is is in l ine w ith Fenno's descr ipt ion o f  the func­
t ion of  the trust ing relat ionsh ip that longstand ing members tr y to establ ish w ith the ir 
const ituenc y. Trust allows representat ive's greater leeway to vote independentl y o f  the ir 
const ituency  (Fenno, 1978). The implicat ion is that c it izens know less about spec ific 
votes. Last , the e ffects o f  electoral compet it iveness seem to be more pronounced for 
respondent ab il it y  to recall informat ion about the ir Senate, and not the ir House, repre­
sentat ives. Th is might be the l inger ing in fluence o f  d ifferences between Senate and House 
races , or it m ight be due to the heightened degree of  compet it iveness in Senate elect ions. 
7 Conclusions 
The research presented in th is paper sheds l ight on two important quest ions - what 
c it izens know about fore ign affairs and what c it izens know about the behaviors o f  the ir 
elected representat ives. Our anal ys is o f  respondent knowledge o f  th is one part icular roll 
call vote has shown first that respondents can have s ign ificant and substant ive knowledge 
about fore ign pol ic y  e vents. Adm ittedl y, fore ign affairs are usual l y not important to 
the Amer ican publ ic. Yet we have argued that under certa in cond it ions, wh ich were 
met regard ing the Persian Gul f War, c ircumstances allow for substant ial amounts of  
in format ion to be presented to the publ ic, and for that in format ion to be rece ived and 
incorporated into the ir percept ions. 
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Seco ndl y, citizens do have i nformation about the vot i ng behavior o f  their House and 
Senate representati ves. At first blush, the percentages willi ng to recall this vote, a nd 
the accuracy rates o f  those who recalled or guessed the vote, might seem small. Yet 
when compared to more general respo nses to roll call voti ng questions i n  other surve ys ,  
these percentages are large. Of  more importance, though, i s  the fact that the aggregate 
and i ndi vidual-level patter ns i n  these respo nses are not random, which provides strong 
e vidence that these questio ns have not elicited simple " no n-attitudes." 
Perceptions var y  s ystematical l y  across representati ves and respondents. We have 
show n that the important covariates e ncompass political sophistication and attitudes 
at the i ndi vidual-level, and contex tual i nformatio n about the representati ves at the ag­
grega te level. Therefore these percep tions, while rooted i n  the cogniti ve processes o f  
citize ns, do have their bases i n  the political world: that is, the y are based on objecti ve 
i nformation ob tai ned from the poli tical environment. 
O f  course, these conclusions arise from intensi ve anal ysis o f  onl y one roll call vote. 
Howe ver, we feel this approach to unders tanding the poli tical perceptions o f  responde nts 
is excep tional l y  important, s ince in con tras t to previous work, we compare the percep­
tions o f  responden ts to the ac tual even ts occurring i n  Co ngress. This is superior to 
previous work which has relied upo n more general percep tions and less accurate " yard­
sticks. " Thus, it would be frui tful for o ther anal yses to supplement ours, exami ni ng 
the percep tions o f  represe ntati ve actions across differe nt polic y issues, for example. I n  




1 .  Question Wording 
• Do y ou remember h ow Representative Name, y our representative in the U.S.
House of Representatives or Senate, voted on the u se of for ce i n  the Per sian 
Gul f?
• (IF YES) d id (he/ she) vote for or again st the u se of for ce?
• (IF NO) w ould y ou guess that (he/she) probably voted for or agai n st the u se of
for ce?
2.  Variable Coding 
The variables in the aggrega te m odel s defined and operationalized: 
• Ideological Extremity: coded 2 i f  the Senator was ei ther e xtremely con servative
(0 thr ough 25) or l iberal (75 thru 1 00) on the Amer ican s for Dem ocratic A cti on
scale, 1 i f  the Sena tor was m oderate (26 thr ough 74) ;
• Party Affiliation: 1 for Democra ts, 0 for Republ i can s;
• Tenure: number of term s the Senator has been in offi ce ;
• Last Election: the number of year s sin ce the Senator last stood for re-ele cti on ;
• Electoral Percentage: the per cen tage of vote s the Sena tor re cei ved i n  tha t  last
ele cti on.
The independen t variables in the indi vidual level m odel s defined and opera tionalized: 
• Media Attention: an additi ve inde x fr om v63, v65, v67, v71 ,  and v72.
• Political Information: an addi ti ve inde x foll ow ing Zaller ( 1986a, 1986b ) . C on­
stru cted from indi ca tors of responden t abili ty to  rate politi cal figures; abili ty to
identify the role of ob scure p oli ti cal figures; abil ity to iden tify the par ty in con trol 
of the H ou se and Senate ;  abili ty to iden ti fy the H ou se i n cumbent in their di stri ct;
willingness to place them sel ves  on four seven-p oin t  scales; and placemen t of the 
Dem ocrats to the le ft of the Republi can s on the same four scale s.
• Political Efficacy: an addi ti ve inde x fr om v504, v505, v506, v507 whi ch ranges
fr om I to 0.
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• Partisan Agreement: coded 1 if the respondent and the representat ive were o f
the same part y affil iat ion,  0 if not.
• Respondent's Education: taken d irectl y from v557.
• Respondent's Evaluation of Representative: coded from feel ing thermometers ;
1 if thermometer rat ing was greater than 60, 0 otherw ise.
• Salience of War: taken from v2409, and coded 1 if the war was e xtremel y or ver y
important to the respondent, 0 if somewhat or not important.
• Agreement with War Vote: coded 1 i f  the respondent was in favor( against) o f
the use o f  force and the y perce ived the represent ive to b e  in favor( against) the use
o f  force, and 0 if there was disagreement.
e Ideological Extrem ity : coded 2 if the Representat ive was extremel y conservat ive 
(0 through 25) or l iberal (75 thru 1 00) on the Americans for Democrat ic Act ion 
scale, 1 i f  the Senator was moderate (26 through 74) ; 
• Tenure: number of terms the representat ive has been in office;
• Last Elect ion: the number of years since the member last stood for re-elect ion 
(onl y Senators) ;
• Electoral Percentage: the percentage of votes the representat ive received in the
last elect ion.
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Table 1 :  Respondent Accuracy By NES Response Groups 
House Stacked Senate Senator 1 Senator 2 
R Recalls Vote 
Percent o f  Sample 24.2 26.9 25.9 27.9 
Percent Correct 77.6 75.5 68.0 82.4 
False Positi ves 50.7 73.2 73.0 73.4 
False Negati ves 49.3 26.8 27.0 26.6 
R Guesses Vote 
Percent o f  Sample 64.0 57.l 62.4 55.5 
Percen t Correct 60.5 58.8 57.0 60.5 
False Positi ves 52.9 67.0 68.8 64.8 
False Negati ves 47. l 33.0 31 .2 35.2 
' Note: Percentages of respondents in 1991 sample who answered war reso­
lution questions and whose representative voted on the resolution. The top 
half of the table gives percentages for those who "recalled" the representa­
tive's vote, and the bottom h alf, those who "guessed." Percent of sample 
is the percent of respondents giving valid answers. Percent correct is the 
percent who correctly stated the representative's vble. False positives are 
calculated: fron1 the total respondents giving an incorrect answer: 
%False"}'" 
%False "lV'' + %False"Y" 
False negatives are calculated similarly. 
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Table 2: Aggregate Models o f  Senator War Resolution Vot ing 
Dependent Variables (Percent o f  Respondents) : 
Independent Able to Correct Correct Correct 
Variables: Recall Re call Guess ing Recall or Guess 
Constant 23.7** 98.1 ** 94. l ** 90.3** 
( 12.6) (20.8) ( 13.0) ( 1 1 .9) 
Ideolog ical Extremity 0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.0007 
(0.00.5) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Party -4.1 * -24.0** - 17.8** -20.2** 
(2.8) (3.9) ( 4 . 1 )  (3.5) 
Tenure 0.44 ** -0.47 -0.06 -0.28 
(0.23) (0.4) (0.4) (0.34) 
Last Ele ct ion -0.89 -0.01 -2.6** - 1 .5* 
( 1 . 1 )  ( 1 .3) ( 1 .3) ( 1 . 1 )  
Ele ctoral Percentage -0.04 -0.30 -0.34** -0.23* 
( 0.16) (0.37) (0 .17) (0 .16}  
Senator Number 5.8** 8.6** 3.4 5.3* 
(3.3) ( 4.4} (4.9) ( 4. 1 )  
R' 0.14 0.44 0.31 0.41 
S .E .  10.7 17.1  16.3 14.2 
Entries tn the table are ordinary least squares regression coefficients, with their 
heteroskeda.stic-consistent standard errors below. * indicates statistical significance 
at the p = 0.10 level and •• indicates significance at the p = 0.05 level, both 
one-tailed tests. Variables are defined and operationalized in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Probabilit y o f  Resolution Vote Recall 
Dependent Variable (Abilit y to Recall Vote): 
Independent Pooled 
Variables: House 1) Senate 1) 
Constant -3.02** -6.56** 
(0.35) ( 1 .89) 
Media Attn. 1 .25** 0.36 1 .05** 0.39 
(0.20) (0. 13) 
Pol. Info. 2.24** 0.57 1 .98** 0.64 
(0.34) (0.22) 
Efficacy 0.31 * 0 .1 1  -0 .28**  -0. 1 1  
(0.20) (0.14) 
Education -0.01 -0.06 -0 .006 -0 .04 
(0.02) (0.01 ) 
E valuation 0 .1 7** 0 .05 0.06 0.02 
(0.09) (0 .06) 
Agreement 0.05 0.02 0.28* * 0 . 1 1  
(0.09) (0.06) 
Salie nce 0. 18** 0 .06 0 . 16** 0.06 
(0.09) (0.06) 
Party -0 .18* *  -0.06 -0.008 -0.003 
(0.09) (0.06) 
ldeol. E xtreme -0 .06 -0.02 0.02 0.008 
(0.09) (0 .06) 
Te nure -0.009* -0 .03 0.007* 0 .03 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Last Election O.il'1 ** -0.06 
(0.02) 
Electoral Margi n 0 .003 0.05 0.006* 0 . 12  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Senator Number 0 .19* *  
( 0 .07) 
-2*LLR 43 1 . 1  805 .4 
% pred. 75.9 72.6 
· · Entries 1n  the, table are ·max1mum-hkehhood est1rnates pro­
bit with standard errors below. * indicates statistical sig­
nificance al lhe p = 0.10 level and ** indicates signifi­
cance at the p = 0.05 level , both one-tailed tests. Columns 
headed V give the "fi rst differences" as discussed in  text. 
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Table 4: Probability of Correct Recall 
Dependent Variable (Accuracy of Recall): 
Independent Pooled 
Variables: House 1) Senate 1) 
Constant - 1 .25** -4.86* 
(0. 73) (3.56) 
Media Attn. -0.83** -0.15 -0.02 -0.008 
(0.45) (0.27) 
Pol. Info. 0.55 0 .12 1.50** 0.55 
(0.65) (0.43) 
Efficacy 0.08 0.02 -0.25 -0.10 
(0.40) (0.27) 
Education 0 .14** 0.70 0.07** 0.45 
(0.04) (0.02) 
Evaluation 0 . 15  0.03 -0.06 -0.02 
(0 .17)  (0. 12)  
Agreement -0.05 -0.01 -0.18* -0.07 
(0. 18)  (0. 1 1 )  
Salience 0 . 12  0.03 -0.02 -0.13 
(0 .19) (0 .12) 
Party 0.43** 0 . 1 1  -0.09 -0.03 
(0 . 19)  (0 . 12)  
ldeol. Extreme -0.03 -0.006 0.003 0.001 
(0 . 19)  (0. 12)  
Tenure -0.02** -0.04 -0.01 * -0.04 
(0.01 ) (0.009) 
Last Election 0.03 -0.05 
(0.04) 
Electoral Margin 0.004 0.03 0.007 0 . 13  
(0.006) (0.007) 
Senator 0.60** 
(0 . 13)  
-2*LLR 63. l 165.9 
3 pred. 76. l 77.6 
Entnes 1n the table are 1nax1mum-:hkehhood prob1t esti­
mates with standard errors below. * indicates statistical 
significance at the p = 0.10 level and ** indicates signifi­
cance at the p = 0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. Columns 
headed Tl give "fi rst differences" as discussed in text. 
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Table 5: Probability of Correct Guess 
Dependent Variable (Accuracy of Guess): 
Independent Pooled 
Variables: House 1) Senate 1) 
Constant -0.07 -8.03** 
(0.39) (2.35) 
Media Attn. -0.59** -0. 1 8  -0.13 -0.05 
.. 
(0.2 1 )  (0 . 15)  
Pol. Info. 0.46* 0 . 16  0.36** 0 . 14  
(0.37) (0.26) 
Efficacy 0.27 0.09 0 . 15 0.05 
(0.23) (0. 16 )  
Education -0.01 -0.06 0.03** 0 . 19  
(0.02) (0.0 1 )  
Evaluation -0 .01 -0.003 0.02 0.007 
(0. 10 )  (0.07) 
Agreement 0.32** 0 . 12 -0.06 -0.02 
(0. 10 )  (0.07) 
Salience 0.07 0.02 -0.006 -0.002 
(0 . 10)  (0.07) 
Party 0 . 1 7* *  0.06 0 . 16** 0.06 
(0. 10 )  (0.08) 
ldeol. Extreme 0.32** 0 . 10 -0.070 -0.03 
(0. 1 0 )  ( 0.08) 
Tenure -0.01 * *  -0.03 -0.0000 -0.0003 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Last Election 0_00** -0. 1 4  
(0.03) 




-2*LLR 280 .. 5 385.2 
% pred. 62.9 60.2 
Note: Entries m the table are.prob1t max1mum-hkehhood 
estimates with standard errors below. * indicates statis­
tical significance at the p = 0 . 1 0  level and ** indicates 
significance at the p = 0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. 
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